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I. INTRODUCTION
N ADDITION to airport security measures carried out by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), many foreign-
based airlines create their own individual security procedures to
ensure flight safety.' With the recent increased focus on airline
and airport security, inventors have sought and received patents
on methods, devices, and systems aimed at increasing commer-
cial flight security. 2 Because these two trends are likely to con-
tinue, collisions between U.S. patents and foreign airlines'
security procedures are inevitable. When these disputes arise,
the courts should apply the temporary presence defense to the
patent infringement claims. This defense protects foreign enti-
ties from infringement liability when using patented inventions
in connection with vessels, aircraft, and vehicles temporarily
within the United States for purposes of participating in interna-
tional commerce.3
A. EL AL'S SECURITY MEASURES
Unlike most U.S.-based airlines that delegate security proto-
cols to the TSA, many foreign-based airlines institute their own
procedures.4 Israel's El Al, long-considered "the most secure
I See DUANE BROWN, FLYING WITHOUT FEAR: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO GET You
WHERE You NEED TO Go 97 (Elisabeth Beller ed., 2d ed. 2009).
2 See Alexander Wolfe, Wolfe's Den: IBM Patenting Airport Security Profiling Tech-
nology, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 19, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://www.information
week.com/news/government/security/222301388.
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006).
4 3 HOMELAND SECURITY: PROTECTING AMERICA'S TARGETS 275 (James J.F. For-
est ed., 2006) ("Passengers on Air France and Lufthansa, for example, face as
many as seven scheduled and random checks from airline and airport personnel
prior to boarding an aircraft.").
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airline in the world,"5 is the ultimate example. El Al conducts
background checks on each passenger 6 and uses profiling to
classify the passengers according to perceived risk: (1) Israelis or
foreign Jews as low-risk; (2) non-Jewish foreigners as medium-
risk; and (3) anyone of Arabic descent as high-risk.7 El Al inter-
views each passenger individually,8 while subjecting passengers
categorized as high-risk to more intense interrogation, as well as
body and luggage searches.9 The interviewers probe for incon-
sistencies in the passengers' responses regarding destination,
the purpose of travel, occupation, and luggage." Passengers are
closely observed, and any interview responses that are inconsis-
tent with observations can lead to more questioning. The
interviewers rely on special training to detect "microexpres-
sions,"12 which are involuntary facial expressions that last just a
fraction of a second and reveal emotions that might indicate a
dishonest response.1 3 Finally, El Al officials inspect all luggage
by x-ray, hand searching, and using decompression chambers,
which detect explosives that would be triggered by the pressure
drop during flight. 4
However, El Al's security measures do not end when the air-
plane pulls away from the gate.15 At least one armed guard is
onboard every flight, and the guards often occupy aisle seats so
that they can quickly react to any situation. 6 El Al airplanes
have a series of cockpit doors, 7 which are bulletprooP8 and re-
main locked from before boarding until after the last passenger
5 Lysiane Gagnon, Let's Look to the Model: El Al, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Sept. 17,
2001, at A17.
6 Israeli-Style Security Might Have Averted Hijackings, USA TODAY, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001/09/12/israelisecurity.htm (last updated
Sept. 13, 2001, 3:03 AM).
7 Vivienne Walt, Unfriendly Skies Are No Match for El Al, USA TODAY, OCt. 1,
2001, at ID, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept1/2001/10/01/
elal-usat.htm.
8 BROWN, supra note 1.
9 Walt, supra note 7.
10 BROWN, supra note 1.
11 See id.
12 Id.
13 PAMELA MEYER, LIESPOTTING: PROVEN TECHNIQUES TO DETECT DECEPTION 63
(2010).
14 BROWN, supra note 1.
15 See Gagnon, supra note 5.
16 See id.
17 BROWN, supra note 1.
18 Gagnon, supra note 5.
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exits the aircraft. 19 Lastly, El Al equips every aircraft in its fleet
with Flight Guard, an Israeli-developed anti-missile system that
automatically launches diversionary flares to lead heat-seeking
missiles astray if the system detects that the airplane has been
targeted.20 With such a comprehensive and evolving set of se-
curity measures, El Al is nearly certain to encroach on issued
U.S. patents in the near future, if it has not already done so.
B. AIRLINE SECURITY PATENTS
While El Al has employed these security measures for de-
cades, 9/11 prompted American inventors to develop methods
and systems aimed at increasing airline and airport security.2 1 A
search of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) database reveals twenty-eight issued patents filed after
9/11 that relate to airport or airline security. 22 As an example,
U.S. Patent No. 7,109,869 provides a method of positively identi-
fying passengers via fingerprint, retinal, or facial scan, and then
electronically tracking their movements throughout the airport
and onto aircraft.23 Additionally, IBM recently applied for
twelve patents related to a system that electronically observes
and analyzes passengers to identify potential threats based on
age, clothing type, and behavior patterns.24 These claimed in-
ventions involve technological advancements of the "Israeli-style
security" employed by El Al.25
In addition, because any U.S. defense agency can impose se-
crecy on any patent whose disclosure might threaten national
security, the issued and published patents likely represent just a
very small sample of the most banal airline security patent appli-
cations.26 Under 35 U.S.C. § 181, the secretary of a defense de-
partment can determine whether granting and publishing a
19 Walt, supra note 7.
20 El Al Fits Fleet with Anti-Missile System, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2006, 7:54 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-02-16-anti-missile-airline-systemx.
htm.
21 See Wolfe, supra note 2.
22 USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, USPTO, http://patft.uspto.gov/
netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (enter "abst/ ((airline or airport) and security)
and apd/9/11/2001->1/22/2011" into query box, and click "Search") (last vis-
ited May 18, 2011).
23 U.S. Patent No. 7,109,869 (filed Jan. 5, 2004).
24 Wolfe, supra note 2.
25 Id.
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
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patent is detrimental to national security. 27 If the secretary so
determines, he can notify the Commissioner of Patents, who
then orders that the patent not be granted and that its applica-
tion be kept secret.28 Subsequently, a 2003 executive order
named the Department of Homeland Security as a defense
agency for purposes of § 181.29 As a result, patents relating to
airline security are subject to § 181 secrecy orders if the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and its agencies, including the TSA,
determine that disclosure would be detrimental to national se-
curity interests.3 0  Consequently, federal agencies were sup-
pressing over 5,000 patents as of 2007,31 and each year the
number of patent applications subject to secrecy orders contin-
ues to grow.
However, these patents will not necessarily remain unenforce-
able forever. While a § 181 secrecy order may be continuously
renewed, it otherwise remains in effect for only one year.3 2 Also,
the USPTO can extend the term of the patent in order to offset
any delays in issuance caused by a secrecy order.3 ' Thus, any
patent currently subject to a secrecy order will become enforcea-
ble as soon as the secrecy order expires, without renewal, no
matter how old the application might be.34 Additionally, if pri-
vate entities, such as foreign airlines, put the claimed invention
into practice, the relevant defense agency might' conclude that
the secrecy order no longer protects any national security inter-
est; in which case the secrecy order will likely expire without
renewal.
Consequently, a collision between U.S. patents and the secur-
ity procedures employed by foreign-based airlines is almost as-
suredly on the horizon. In order to avoid infringement, airlines
must steer clear of not only the dozens of issued and published
patents related to airline security, but also potentially thousands
of patents currently subject to secrecy orders. 5 Many of these
patents might be properly characterized as heading off the next
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.; Exec. Order No. 13,286 § 85, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,632 (Feb. 28, 2003).
- See 35 U.S.C. § 181; Exec. Order No. 13,286 § 85, 68 Fed.'Reg. 10,632.
31 More Than 5,000 U.S. Patents Are Now State Secrets, HOMELANDSECURITYNEw-
SWiRE.COM (Oct. 19, 2007), http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/more-5000-
us-patents-are-now-state-secrets.
32 35 U.S.C. § 181.
33 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C) (2006).
34 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(C); 35 U.S.C. § 181.
35 See More Than 5,000 U.S. Patents Are Now State.Secrets, supra note 31.
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logical step in the development of security procedures for air-
lines like El Al because the claims incorporate new technology
into the theories and procedures that those airlines already em-
ploy. 6 Thus, airlines might suddenly become liable for patent
infringement based on their current security measures, and new
patents might essentially foreclose the possibility of changing or
improving those measures. Because Congress tends to act slowly
to problems as they emerge, a court will likely face this issue as a
matter of first impression with little or no guidance. 7 When
these disputes arise, U.S. courts should apply the temporary
presence defense, which is the most effective way to resolve
these conflicts while promoting international commerce and
the safety and security of air travel.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE
DEFENSE TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress
the power to secure to inventors exclusive rights to their discov-
eries for a limited time in order " [t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts. ' 3 8 By including this constitutional
provision, the framers recognized that "inventions are public
goods," valuable to society, but "costly to make and ... difficult
to control" once disclosed.3 9 Because of this, inventors lack in-
centive to invest in creating new and useful inventions without
any guarantee of marketplace exclusivity. 40 Patent law creates a
"market-driven incentive" for innovation by granting to the in-
ventor exclusivity for a limited time.4' Thus, patents represent
"a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technol-
ogy, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time."42
Congress quickly exercised its power under the Patent Clause
by passing the first U.S. patent statute in 1790, which granted to
inventors the exclusive right to make, construct, use, or sell their
36 See Wolfe, supra note 2.
37 Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global Com-
puter Networks, 68 TUL. L. Riv. 1, 64-65 (1993).
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
39 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGI-
cAL AGE 127 (4th ed. 2007).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
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invention for a period of fourteen years." Subsequently, the
patent system continued to develop into today's statutory
scheme, which generally allows a patentee "to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or [from] importing the invention
into the United States . . . or products made [from it] .""4 Be-
cause patent rights are similar to property rights in many ways,
infringement is treated as a form of trespass.45 Thus, remedies
often include an injunction to stop the infringing activity,46
along with "damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement. 47
U.S. patent law does not apply extraterritorially, as unautho-
rized use of a patented invention is only infringement if it takes
place in the United States.4" However, this leaves foreign per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States, including for-
eign entities using U.S. airports or seaports, liable for activities
that would not be infringing if done in their home countries.49
It is in this context that the temporary presence defense devel-
oped in order to protect vehicles of international commerce
that are temporarily within the United States from patent in-
fringement liability that might unduly burden international
commerce 50
A. ENGLISH ORIGINS OF THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE DEFENSE
The temporary presence defense originated in England,
where it was first raised in the 1851 case of Caldwell v. Vanvlis-
sengen, before the Chancery Court in England.51 The invention
at issue covered an improved ship propeller, and the accused
infringers were Dutch shippers using the propeller on Dutch
ships traveling between Holland and England to engage in
trade.52 The defendant Dutch shippers argued that it would be
43 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (repealed 1793).
44 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
45 MERGES ET AL., supra note 39, at 348.
46 Id.
47 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (c), (e), (g) (2006).
49 See id.
50 See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
51 Ted L. Field, The "Planes, Trains, and Automobiles" Defense to Patent Infringe-
ment for Today's Global Economy: Section 272 of the Patent Act, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH.
L. 26, 32 (2006).
52 Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 571 (Ch.).
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unduly burdensome if a foreign shipper could be liable for hav-
ing an invention on his vessel, which was unprotected in his
home country, and bringing his vessel into an English port."
The defendants additionally argued that such a rule might be
asserted unfairly against a ship accidentally driven into English
waters by a storm.54 Unfortunately for the defendants, the
Chancery Court did not agree and ruled that foreigners are uni-
versally held subject to the laws of the country in which they find
themselves. 5 The court refused to recognize the proposed de-
fense, calling the adoption of such an exception to infringe-
ment a matter of national policy that was best left to the
legislature .56
In the wake of the Caldwell decision, Parliament feared that
the possibility of patent infringement liability would have a chil-
ling effect on commerce between England and other coun-
tries.57 Thus, the legislature amended the English patent law to
adopt the temporary presence defense.58 The first statute recog-
nizing the temporary presence defense provided:
No letters patent for any invention (granted after the passing of
this Act) shall extend to prevent the use of such invention in any
foreign ship or vessel, or for the navigation of any foreign ship or
vessel, which may be in any port of Her Majesty's dominions, or
in any of the waters within the jurisdiction of any of Her Majesty's
Courts, where such invention is not so used for the manufacture
of any goods or commodities to be vended within or exported
from Her Majesty's dominions: Provided always, that this enact-
ment shall not extend to the ships or vessels of any foreign state
of which the laws authorize subjects of such foreign state, having
patents or like privileges for the exclusive use or exercise of in-
ventions within its territories, to prevent or interfere with the use
of such inventions in British ships or vessels, or in or about the
navigation of British ships or vessels, while in the ports of such
foreign state, or in the waters within the jurisdiction of its Courts,
where such inventions are not so used for the manufacture of
goods or commodities to be vended within or exported from the
territories of such foreign state. 9
53 Id. at 574.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 575-76.
56 Id. at 577.
57 Field, supra note 51, at 34.
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., ch. 83, § 26
(Eng.)).
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In summary, the first recognized version of the defense: "(1) ap-
plied to foreign ships temporarily present in [England]," (2) ap-
plied to any use of a patented invention in a vessel or for its
navigation, (3) excluded any use of a patented invention for
manufacturing goods, and (4) required the country from which
the foreign ship hailed to also recognize a temporary presence
defense for English ships.6"
B. ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES: BROWN V. DUCHESNE
A few years later, the temporary presence defense made its
way across the Atlantic to the United States. In an 1856 deci-
sion, the Supreme Court applied the defense in Brown v.
Duchesne, a case involving a patented configuration of sails on a
ship.61 Chief Justice Taney began his opinion by recognizing
that the U.S. patent laws apply to foreign defendants within the
jurisdiction just as forcefully as they do to citizens.62 The Court
also noted that a literal interpretation of the patent statute
would not find any temporary presence defense. 6 The Court
refused to endorse such a construction, however, because doing
so might defeat the purpose that Congress intended to accom-
plish or might effectively annul a power delineated to the fed-
eral government. 64
Taney held that Congress intended the patent laws to protect
inventors under Article I's Patent Clause, which grants a wholly
domestic power.6 1 And, because Congress was acting solely
6 Id. at 34-35.
61 See generally Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1857).
62 Id. at 194 ("For undoubtedly every person who is found within the limits of a
Government, whether for temporary purposes or as a resident, is bound by its
laws.").
63 Id. ("The general words used in the clause of the patent laws granting the
exclusive right to the patentee to use the improvement, taken by themselves, and
literally construed, without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction
the claim of the plaintiff.").
64 Id. at 194-95 ("But this mode of expounding a statute has never been
adopted by any enlightened tribunal-because it is evident that in many cases it
would defeat the object which the Legislature intended to accomplish ...
Neither will the court, in expounding a statute, give to it a construction which
would in any degree disarm the Government of a power which has been confided
to it to be used for the general good-or which would enable individuals to em-
barrass it, in the discharge of the high duties it owes to the community-unless
plain and express words indicated that such was the intention of the
Legislature.").
65 Id. at 195 ("The power thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessa-
rily confined within the limits of the United States."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8.
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under the authority of the Patent Clause, which does not grant
any power to regulate international commerce or the vehicles
used in international commerce, Congress must not have in-
tended the patent statutes to reach foreign vessels temporarily
harbored in the United States.66 The Court held that it should
not be assumed that in passing the patent laws, Congress in-
tended to go beyond the power of the Patent Clause and also
exercise additional powers, granted elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion and completely unrelated to the protection of inventors.67
Next, the Court held that the plaintiff was only minimally in-
jured, and the defendant did not benefit from the accused activ-
ity.6 8 Taney stated that if the ship's captain manufactured or
sold the invention or products made from the invention from
the vessel while it was in a U.S. harbor, then the plaintiff would
be injured and the defendant would be liable.69 Injury would
occur because those activities would be in competition with the
patentee and would diminish his right to marketplace exclusivity
in the United States.70 But, because the allegedly infringing ac-
tivity only involved limited use of the invention while entering
and exiting the harbor, the patentee did not suffer great com-
pensable harm, nor did the defendant receive any great bene-
fit.71 Thus, while patent law generally treats such infringements
66 Brown, 60 U.S. at 195 ("It confers no power on Congress to regulate com-
merce, or the vehicles of commerce, which belong to a foreign nation, and occa-
sionally visit our ports in their commercial pursuits .... And when Congress are
legislating to protect authors and inventors, their attention is necessarily at-
tracted to the authority under which they are acting .... ").
67 Id. ("[A]nd it ought not lightly to be presumed that they intended to go
beyond [the Patent Clause], and exercise another and distinct power, conferred
on them for a different purpose.").
68 Id. at 196 ("Now, it is obvious that the plaintiff sustained no damage, and the
defendant derived no material advantage, from the use of an improvement of
this kind by a foreign vessel in a single voyage to the United States, or from
occasional voyages in the ordinary pursuits of commerce; or if any damage is
sustained on the one side, or any profit or advantage gained on the other, it is so
minute that it is incapable of any appreciable value.").
69 Id. ("If it had been manufactured on her deck while she was lying in the port
of Boston, or if the captain had sold it there, he would undoubtedly have tres-
passed upon the rights of the plaintiff, and would have been justly answerable for
the profit and advantage he thereby obtained.").
70 Id. ("For, by coming in competition with the plaintiff, where the plaintiff was
entitled to the exclusive use, he thereby diminished the value of his property.").
71 Id. ("[T] he only use made of it, which can be supposed to interfere with the
rights of the plaintiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of the harbor,
when she arrived or was about to depart, and while she was within the jurisdiction
of the United States.").
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as a form of trespass where damages are presumed, justice did
not compel the Court to do so here in light of the competing
policy goal of preventing undue burdens on international
commerce.
72
Finally, the Court held that allowing a patentee to assert his
patent against foreign vessels temporarily in the United States
for purposes of carrying out international commerce would ef-
fectively confer a political power, instead of a property right.7 1
If enforced in this context, the patent would embarrass Con-
gress's treaty-making powers and interfere with its power to reg-
ulate commerce.7 ' The Court reasoned that if the
congressionally-created patent rights were to extend to foreign
ships in U.S. harbors, then in order to grant civil immunity to
foreign shippers, Congress would have to condemn a portion of
the patentees' property interests and compensate them accord-
ingly.7 Because it could not have been Congress's intent to
grant a property right that it must repurchase in order to exer-
cise its constitutional powers, the only sound conclusion was
that Congress did not intend to grant patentees exclusive rights
that extend to foreign vessels in this context. 76 Thus, the Su-
preme Court first recognized the temporary presence defense
by holding that the patentee's rights did not extend to foreign
vessels in U.S. ports and the use of the invention in the construc-
tion, fitting out, or equipment of the vessel was not infringing if
72 Id. at 196-97 ("[A]lthough no real damage was sustained by the plaintiff,
and no profit or advantage gained by the defendant, the law presumes a damage,
and that the action may be maintained on that ground .... We think these laws
ought to be construed in the spirit in which they were made-that is, as founded
in justice-and should not be strained by technical constructions to reach cases
which Congress evidently could not have contemplated .... ).
7 Id. at 197 ("The construction claimed by the plaintiff would confer on pat-
entees not only rights of property, but also political power .... ).
74 Id. ("The construction claimed by the plaintiff would . . . enable them to
embarrass the treaty-making power in its negotiations with foreign nations, and
also to interfere with the legislation of Congress when exercising its constitu-
tional power to regulate commerce.").
75 Id. at 197-98 ("And in the case [I] have stated, the Government would be
unable to carry into effect its treaty stipulations without the consent of the paten-
tee, unless it resorted to its right of eminent domain, and went through the tedi-
ous and expensive process of condemning so much of the right of property of the
patentee as related to foreign vessels, and paying him such a compensation there-
for[e] as should be awarded to him by the proper tribunal. The same difficulty
would exist in executing a law of Congress in relation to foreign ships and vessels
trading to this country.").
76 See id.
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it was placed upon the vessel in a foreign port and authorized by
the laws of the vessel's home country.77
Eventually, Congress codified the Court's opinion in Brown by
incorporating a temporary presence defense into the patent stat-
utes. 78 Nevertheless, over 150 years later Brown remains instru-
mental in interpreting and applying the defense.79
C. THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE DEFENSE IN THE
PARIS CONVENTION
The next development in the United States' temporary pres-
ence doctrine came in 1925, when a version of the defense was
incorporated into the Paris Convention for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property (Paris Convention). 80 The Paris Convention,
initially signed in 1883, was the first major international treaty
aimed at helping individuals protect their intellectual creations
from unauthorized exploitation in foreign countries.8" In 1925,
the treaty gained a temporary presence defense provision.8 2 To-
day, 173 nations, including the United States, are signatories to
the treaty.83 Article 5ter of the agreement provides:
In any country of the Union the following shall not be consid-
ered as infringements of the rights of a patentee:
1. the use on board vessels of other countries of the Union of
devices forming the subject of his patent in the body of the ves-
sel, in the machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories, when
such vessels temporarily or accidentally enter the waters of the
said country, provided that such devices are used there exclu-
sively for the needs of the vessel;
2. the use of devices forming the subject of the patent in the
construction or operation of aircraft or land vehicles of other
countries of the Union, or of accessories of such aircraft or land
77 Id. at 198-99.
78 See 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006).
79 See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("Confronted with an ambiguous statute, we turn to the legislative
history to discern Congress' [s] intent . . . .which in turn directs us to Brown
.... .).
80 Field, supra note 51, at 41.
81 WIPA Treaties-General Information, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (WIPO),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited July 28, 2011).
82 Field, supra note 51, at 41.
83 Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (WIPO), http://www.wipo.
in t/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country-id=ALL&start-year=ANY&end-year=
ANY&search_what=C&treaty_id=2 (last visited May 22, 2011).
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vehicles, when those aircraft or land vehicles temporarily or acci-
dentally enter the said country.8 4
Thus, the Paris Convention's temporary presence defense: (1)
applies to foreign ships, aircraft, or land vehicles temporarily or
accidentally in the country; and (2) requires a form of reciproc-
ity in that the country of the foreign ship, aircraft, or vehicle
must also be a signatory to the Paris Convention.8 5 The treaty
also requires one of two alternative permissible uses, depending
on whether the conveyance at issue is a vessel.86 For vessels, the
patented invention may be used in the body, machinery, tackle,
gear, or accessories, so long as the invention is used exclusively
for the needs of the vessel.8 7 For aircraft and land vehicles, the
patented invention may be used in the construction or opera-
tion of the conveyance or its accessories.8 8
Because the United States is a signatory to the treaty," the
temporary presence defense laid out in Article 5ter remains
valid in the United States. Additionally, like Brown, the Paris
Convention continues to play a vital role in interpreting the sub-
sequent statutory temporary presence defense. °
D. A SPECIES OF THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE DEFENSE IN THE
CHICAGO CONVENTION
Similarly, a version of the temporary presence defense is in-
cluded in the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the
Chicago Convention).91 The United States is one of fifty-two na-
tions that signed the Chicago Convention in 1944.92 Today, the
Chicago Convention remains in effect for the United States and
84 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5ter, July 14,





89 Contracting Parties, supra note 83.
90 See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("Confronted with an ambiguous statute, we turn to the legislative
history to discern Congress'Is] intent. .. , which in turn directs us to Brown and
the Paris Convention.").
91 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 27, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1,591 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
92 ICAO Documents, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/icaonet/
dcs/7300.html (last visited July 28, 2011).
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189 other countries that are parties to the agreement.9" The
treaty's goal is to establish principles and agreements that facili-
tate safe, orderly, and economical international air transporta-
tion services.94  Article 27 provides a defense to patent
infringement related to civil aviation, which is a close cousin to
the temporary presence defense set forth in Brown and the Paris
Convention:
"(a) While engaged in international air navigation, any au-
thorized entry of aircraft of a contracting State into the territory
of another contracting State or authorized transit across the terri-
tory of such State with or without landing shall not entail.., any
claim against the owner or operator thereof ... by or on behalf
of such State or any person therein, on the ground that the con-
struction, mechanism, parts, accessories or operation of the air-
craft is an infringement of any patent.., duly granted... in the
State whose territory is entered by the aircraft ....
(c) The benefits of this Article shall apply only to such States
parties to this Convention, as either (1) are parties to the Inter-
national Convention for the protection of Industrial Property
and to any amendments thereof; or (2) have enacted patent laws
which recognize and give adequate protection to inventions
made by the nationals of the other States parties to this
Convention."9 5
Thus, the Chicago Convention provides a defense connected to
international civil aviation that literally appears broader than
what is afforded by the traditional temporary presence de-
fense. 6 The Article 27 defense's only requirement is that the
invention be used in the "construction, mechanisms, parts, ac-
cessories or operation" of an aircraft that is (1) of another coun-
try that is party to the treaty, (2) authorized to be in the
jurisdiction, and (3) engaged in international air travel.97
While the provisions of the Chicago Convention remain valid
and in effect, no U.S. patent infringement case has ever turned
solely on Article 27.98 Because Article 27 only applies in the civil
93 See Convention on International Civil Aviation Signed at Chicago on 7 December
1944, INT'L CIVIL AViATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/chicago.pdf
(last visited May 22, 2011).
94 ICAO Documents, supra note 92.
95 Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (quot-
ing Chicago Convention, supra note 91).
96 Id.
97 Chicago Convention, supra note 91.
98 See Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124.
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aviation context, there have been few opportunities for its use."g
Consequently, in the one instance where a defense under Arti-
cle 27 was asserted, the court merely held that Article 27 was
valid and not superseded by the subsequent statutory defense. 00
However, the court's ultimate determination did not rely solely
on Article 27, but instead on the statutory defense, Brown, the
Paris Convention, and the Chicago Convention.10 1
E. CODIFICATION OF THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE DEFENSE IN 35
U.S.C. § 272
Finally, Congress enacted the temporary presence defense as
part of the Patent Act of 1952, incorporating the defense as the
Supreme Court first recognized it in 1856, and as the Paris Con-
vention adopted it in 1925.112 The legislative history is relatively
sparse for § 272, with only two mentions of it in the legislative
record. 10 3 The first reference states that "Section 272 is a new
section in the law relating to infringement, but it is of relatively
little importance and it follows a paragraph in a treaty to which
the United States is a party." ' 4 The second provides, "This sec-
tion follows the requirement of the [Paris Convention], to
which the United States is a party, and also codifies the holding
of the Supreme Court that use of a patented invention on board
a foreign ship does not infringe a patent."10 5 Thus, the legisla-
tive history shows, at least relative to the more sweeping changes
in the Patent Act of 1952, Congress believed § 272 was a mere
formality, codifying the defense already made into law by the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown and bringing the patent stat-
utes into compliance with the Paris Convention.' 6 Some com-
mentators have lamented that the legislative history is sparse
and relatively dismissive of the importance of the statute. 1°7
However, the fact that the legislative history specifically refer-
ences the Paris Convention and the Brown decision, when com-
bined with the overall history of the defense, sheds tremendous
light on the statute's underlying purpose.
99 See Chicago Convention, supra note 91.
100 Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124.
101 Id.
102 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 28, § 272, 66 Stat. 812 (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§ 272 (2006)).
103 Field, supra note 51, at 43-44.
104 S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
105 Id. at 28.
106 See Field, supra note 51, at 44.
107 Id.
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As illustrated in Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris Conven-
tion, the temporary presence defense grew out of concerns over
the excessive burden that would be placed on foreign shippers if
they had to insure that their vessels complied with the patent
laws of every nation that the vessel might visit during its life-
time.'0 8 Avoiding liability would be difficult, considering that
any given invention may be patented in some countries and not
in others, and the same invention may be owned by different
people from one country to the next.' °9 In fact, the defendants
in Caldwell, the first case to address the issue, raised that very
argument.110 While the case was ultimately decided against the
defendant, 1 ' the English Parliament responded quickly to en-
sure that the case and its result would not hinder commerce." 2
Thus, in passing § 272, Congress intended to join an interna-
tional movement to make the vehicles of international com-
merce immune from patent infringement liability in order to
avoid an excessive drag on international commerce."'
The current version of § 272 provides:
The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle of any
country which affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft or vehi-
cles of the United States, entering the United States temporarily
or accidentally, shall not constitute infringement of any patent, if
the invention is used exclusively for the needs of the vessel, air-
craft or vehicle and is not offered for sale or sold in or used for
the manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the
United States." 4
108 Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("Both Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention demonstrate a
concern to leave the channels of international commerce, or more accurately the
vessels and vehicles that pass through these channels, free from the excessive
burdens that would result if such vessels or vehicles had to conform to the patent
laws of all nations that the vessel or vehicle visited during its lifetime.").
109 Id. ("Different inventions are likely to be patented in different countries,
and the same invention may be owned by different parties in different
countries.").
110 Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 571, 574 (Ch.).
III Id. at 577.
112 Field, supra note 51, at 34.
113 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1330 ("In section 272, Congress intended to join
an international movement to place foreign-owned means of international trans-
port beyond the reach of domestic patentees' exclusive rights because the cost of
complying with multiple, inconsistent rights of exclusion provided by the patent
regimes of a large number of countries would likely place an excessive drag on
international commerce.").
114 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006).
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Thus, the five elements of the defense as codified in § 272 are as
follows:
1) Vessel, aircraft, or vehicle - the accused invention must be
used in a vessel, aircraft, or vehicle;
2) Reciprocity - the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle must be from an-
other country that provides a similar defense to U.S. vessels,
aircraft, or vehicles;
3) Temporary or accidental presence - the vessel, aircraft or ve-
hicle must be present in the United States only temporarily or
accidentally;
4) Exclusively for the needs of the vehicle - the accused inven-
tion must be used "exclusively for the needs" of the vessel,
aircraft, or vehicle; and
5) No U.S. sales or manufacturing activity - the accused in-
fringer must not sell or offer to sell the accused invention,
nor use it to manufacture anything to be sold in or exported
from the United States.1 15
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TEMPORARY
PRESENCE DEFENSE
Despite its importance in preventing potential patent in-
fringement liability from creating an unnecessary drag on com-
merce, U.S. courts have only interpreted § 272 three times.' 16
A. CALi V. JAPAN AIRLINES, INC.
After Congress enacted § 272 in 1952, no court applied the
temporary presence defense until 1974 when the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York decided Cali v. Japan
Airlines, Inc.'1 7 The patent at issue covered an improvement to
jet engines, which foreign airlines were using on jets that regu-
larly and frequently carried passengers and freight into and over
the United States." 8 The defendant airlines contended that the
use was not infringement under § 272, Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention, or Article 27 of the Chicago Convention. 1 9
The patentee first argued that the Patent Clause did not au-
thorize Congress to grant limited exclusivity to inventors, nor had
115 Field, supra note 51, at 28 (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29
Fed. Cl. 197, 240 (1993)).
116 See Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1325-26; Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 231-32;
Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
117 See Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1122-23.
118 Id. at 1122.
119 Id. at 1122-23.
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Congress attempted to limit patents granted under 35 U.S.C.
§ 154.120 Consequently, the patentee argued that Article 27 of
the Chicago Convention was invalid since it purported to create
a wide area of permissible use for patented inventions incorpo-
rated into aircraft. 121 The district court rejected this argument
by holding that the Patent Clause was not self-executing and
that it permitted Congress to grant patent rights without so com-
manding.1 22 Because the source of the patent right is statutory,
and not the constitutional provision itself, the court held that
"Congress... may put such limitations upon it as it pleases. "123
The court went on to cite Brown as an example of permissible
limitations imposed on statutory patent grants.124
The district court also relied on Brown in addressing the pat-
entee's second argument that because § 272 was enacted after
the Chicago Convention, the narrower defense provision in the
statute superseded Article 27 of the treaty. 125 The Cali court ad-
dressed this contention by pointing out that the Supreme Court
held in Brown that patent law must be construed so as not to
embarrass the treaty powers of Congress. 126 Thus, holding that
§ 272 effectively nullified the treaty would be inappropriate.127
The district court went on to note that Article 27 of the Chicago
Convention is not inconsistent with § 272 or Article 5ter of the
Paris Convention. 12 The mere fact that all three intersect to
some degree in one matter does not mean that one or more
must be invalidated. 129
Finally, the patentee argued that § 272 only extended to for-
eign aircraft temporarily or accidentally in the United States,
and not to aircraft belonging to entities that maintain regular
and systematic airline services in the United States. 3 ° While the
district court conceded that the Brown opinion emphasized that
the patentee in that case received no damage and that the ac-
cused infringer received no benefit, the court did not read
Brown as requiring that only trivial uses may be considered non-
120 Id. at 1124-25.
121 Id. at 1124.
122 Id.
123 Id. (quoting Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900)).
124 Id. at 1124-25.
125 Id. at 1124.
126 Id. at 1125-26.
127 See id. at 1126.
128 Id. at 1127.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1124.
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infringing. 13 1 The eastern district even questioned whether the
use in Brown was as insignificant as the Supreme Court sug-
gested since it was "presumably indispensable" in entering and
leaving port.13 2 The court further held that § 272 should not be
interpreted as to only cover trivia but should be understood to
create a useful immunity from patent infringement liability.133
Deferring to the purpose of § 272 and Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention in meeting the needs of international commerce,
the district court held that the term "temporarily" must at least
cover "entering for the purpose of completing a voyage, turning
about, and continuing or commencing a new voyage. 1134 Be-
cause this definition applied to the international travels of the
aircraft involved, the court held that those aircraft were never
more than temporarily present in the United States. 13 5 Having
addressed all of the patentee's arguments, the district court de-
nied his motion for summary judgment.136
B. HUGHES AIRCRAFT Co. v. UNITED STATES
The second case to interpret the temporary presence defense
was Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, decided by the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims in 1993.13 The plaintiffs patent covered a
method and device to control the spin of a spacecraft. 138 The
plaintiff sought compensation after the federal government
brought five foreign spacecraft that utilized the invention into
the United States and launched them. 39 The court rejected a
§ 272 defense as to four of the spacecraft, holding that, unlike
the Cali and Brown cases, the spacecraft were not vessels or air-
craft temporarily brought to the United States as a means of
conveyance.' 40 Instead, the spacecraft were more accurately cat-
egorized as cargo brought to the United States for use, and in





136 Id. at 1128.
137 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993).
138 Id. at 201.
139 Id. Hughes sought compensation under 14 U.S.C. § 1498, which provides a
remedy whenever the United States uses or manufactures a patented invention
without a license. Id. at 208. While the claim is based on a theory of compulsory
taking by eminent domain, the legal standard is generally the same as that for
infringement under Title 35. Id.
140 Id. at 232-33.
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this case, the use happened to be launching.' Consequently,
the first four spacecraft were not vehicles under § 272, and the
government was unable to establish the first element of the tem-
porary presence defense, which requires that the invention be
used with respect to a vessel, aircraft or vehicle. 4 2
However, as to the fifth spacecraft, which launched in 1984,
the court held that it was a vehicle brought to the United States
because it was the only spacecraft in question that launched af-
ter Congress extended § 272 protection to spacecraft.1 43 The
relevant statutory provision, 24 U.S.C. § 2457(k), took effect in
1981144 and states that "'any object intended for launch,
launched, or assembled in outer space shall be considered a ve-
hicle for the purpose of Section 272.' ""45- Thus, the "vehicle" ele-
ment was satisfied for the fifth spacecraft. 141
Next, the court turned to the remaining four elements of the
§ 272 temporary presence defense for the fifth spacecraft. First,
the court held that the "temporarily" element was met because
the spacecraft entered the United States only one time for a
short duration before launch. 147 By comparison, even the air-
craft in Cali were held to be temporarily present in the United
States even though their presence was regular and systematic. 14
Second, the court held that the "reciprocity" element was satis-
fied because the spacecraft was shipped from England, a coun-
try that has long recognized a form of the temporary presence
defense, both under its own patent statutes and as a signatory to
the Paris Convention.' 49 The plaintiff argued that because En-
gland did not have a statute identical to the United States' provi-
sion making the temporary presence defense specifically
available for U.S. spacecraft brought into England for launch, the
reciprocity element was not satisfied.1 50 However, the court dis-
agreed with the premise that § 272 requires that the other coun-
try provide an identical privilege for the given situation, instead
requiring only that the other country generally provide a similar
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 240.
144 Id.




149 Id. at 240-41.
150 Id. at 241 n.67.
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defense to American vessels, aircraft, and vehicles.'51 Finally,
the court held that the last two elements were satisfied because
the invention was exclusively for the needs of the spacecraft and
the invention was not offered for sale or used for manufacture
in the United States.1 52 With all five of the elements satisfied,
the court held that the § 272 defense did apply for use of the
invention related to the fifth spacecraft. 53
C. NATIONAL STEEL CAR, LTD. v. CANAD.IAN PACIFIC
RAILWAY, LTD.
The most recent case involving the temporary presence de-
fense was decided in 2004 by the Federal Circuit. 154 National
Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd., a landmark case,
represents the first time that the Federal Circuit, which has ex-
clusive appellate jurisdiction in patent infringement cases, inter-
preted § 272.155
The defendant, Canadian Pacific, was a Canadian railroad
company that owned rail lines in the United States and Canada
on which it shipped Canadian lumber into the United States. 156
Canadian Pacific would use Canadian locomotives to move its
railcars into the United States as far as Canadian Pacific's rail
lines extended.15 7 Then, if the railcar needed to proceed fur-
ther, it would be interchanged to a U.S. railroad company's rail
lines and moved by the U.S. railroad company's locomotives to
its final destination before returning, almost always empty.'58
Canadian Pacific's railcars spent fifty-six to fifty-seven percent of
their useful lives in the United States, whether measured in time
or total miles traveled. 59
151 Id.
152 Id. at 241.
153 Id.
154 See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
155 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1) (2006) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final
decision of a district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction of that court
was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title .... "). Section 1338
provides that "[t] he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(2006).
156 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1323.
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The plaintiff, National Steel Car, held a U.S. patent for a rail-
road car with a lower intermediate section between its front and
rear wheels. 6 This "drop-deck" car allowed for loads of greater
volume and provided more stability by virtue of a lower center
of gravity.161 Defendant Canadian Pacific, a former purchaser of
National Steel Car's patented railcars, arranged to buy a new
fleet of 525 railcars of the same design from Greenbrier, a U.S.
company with a manufacturing facility in Canada, at a cost of
over $21 million. 16 2 National Steel Car filed suit in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved
for a preliminary injunction to stop the allegedly infringing ac-
tivity.163 In response, the district court held that Canadian Pa-
cific's § 272 defense lacked substantial merit and issued the
injunction.'64  Defendant Canadian Pacific immediately
appealed. 65
On appeal, the Federal Circuit thoroughly analyzed the his-
tory of the temporary presence defense and concluded that a
broader application of the defense was required to be consistent
with the statutory scheme, relevant precedents, international ob-
ligations, and underlying policies.166 The appellate court then
examined the four elements on which the case depended and
held that Canadian Pacific's § 272 defense did have substantial
merit and reversed the district court's award of a preliminary
injunction.167
The first issue that the appellate court attacked was whether
the railcar constituted a vehicle of another country under the
temporary presence statute. 6 ' The district court had reasoned
that a train, and not the individual railcar, was the relevant vehi-
cle and that the nationality of the locomotive determines the
nationality of the entire train.'69 Thus, according to the district
court, when an accused railcar is attached to a U.S. locomotive,
it ceases to be part of a Canadian vehicle present in the United
160 Id. at 1322.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1323.
163 Id. at 1324.
164 Id. (noting that neither the § 272 defense nor the invalidity defense raised
by Canadian Pacific presented a substantial question precluding a preliminary
injunction).
165 Id.
166 Field, supra note 51, at 69-70.
167 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1334.
168 Id. at 1328.
169 Id.
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States.17 The appellate court rejected this analysis and referred
instead to the definition for "vehicle" in 1 U.S.C. § 4 of the Dic-
tionary Act, which includes "'every description of carriage or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on land.' 171 The court then examined
the ordinary meaning of "carriage" and found it to encompass
"'means of conveyance,' 'a wheeled vehicle for people,' or 'a
wheeled support carrying a burden.' '1 7 2 With this definition,
the appellate court determined that an individual railcar may be
a foreign vehicle for purposes of § 272, irrespective of the na-
tionality of the train's locomotive.1 7 3 While the court acknowl-
edged that there may sometimes be difficulty in distinguishing
between a vessel, aircraft, or vehicle and its cargo, the railcars at
issue in this case did not present any ambiguity. 7 1
Next, the appellate court turned to the requirement that the
vehicle's presence in the United States be temporary.175 The
court found that the plain meaning approach it used for deci-
phering the meaning of "vehicle" was unworkable for the term
"temporarily. ' 176 The appellate court deemed the first defini-
tion, "for a brief period," too indeterminate to be useful because
"brief' is a relative concept that provides no appropriate mean-
ing in isolation.1 7 7 The court held the second plain meaning
definition, "during a limited time," was absurdly broad because
presence for any period of time is literally "limited" provided
that it is not permanent. 7 s With these definitions lacking, the
court turned to the history of the statute and its predecessors
and gleaned that temporarily should be defined in light of the
temporary presence defense's purpose of promoting interna-
tional commerce.1 79 Thus, temporarily is not defined in relation
to the actual duration of the presence. 8 The appellate court
170 Id.
171 Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
172 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343
(1993)).
173 Id. at 1328-29.
174 Id. at 1328.
175 Id. at 1329.
176 Id.
177 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note
172, at 2353).
178 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note
172, at 2353).
179 Id. at 1329-30.
180 Id. at 1330-31.
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ultimately settled on a test for temporary presence that is satis-
fied if the vehicle enters the United States for a finite period of
time with the sole purpose of participating in international com-
merce, regardless of the length of its stay.18 1
Applying its test, the appellate court concluded that because
the railcars enter the United States for a finite period with the
sole purpose of participating in international commerce, the
railcars may be temporarily present under § 272.182 However,
the court cautioned that if the railcars were used for purposes of
domestic commerce once they were in the United States, then
the railcars' presence would cease to be temporary.
1 83
The third element that the appellate court examined was the
requirement that the invention be used exclusively for the needs
of the vehicle."8 4 The district court had construed the holdings
of Brown, Cali, and Hughes Aircraft narrowly and determined that
in order to be exclusively for the needs of the vehicle, the inven-
tion must help propel the trains, help control their direction, or
otherwise help to make them work. 8 The appellate court sum-
marily rejected this restrictive interpretation and held that in-
ventions used for structural needs are within the plain meaning
of the statute, to the same degree as inventions addressing pro-
pulsive needs."8 6 The appellate court referred to Brown, where
the requirement's analog was satisfied if the invention was
"'used in the construction, fitting out, or equipment' of a ves-
sel."'8 7 The appellate court also observed that the Paris Conven-
tion's scope of noninfringing uses includes uses in the
construction or operation of vehicles or their accessories. 88 Be-
cause both Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention ex-
pressly provide that the invention may be used in the
construction of vehicles, the district court erred in construing
the § 272 requirement to only include operational needs.'
Finally, the appellate court shed light on the requirement that
the invention not be sold or offered for sale in the United
181 Id. at 1331.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1332. For example, if after reaching their destination in the United
States the railcars were then used to carry freight from that location to another
within the United States, the presence would cease to be temporary.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1332-33.
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States. 9 ° The district court held that this element was defeated
by Greenbrier's offer to sell the railcars to various companies in
the United States.19 ' The appellate court clarified that it is not
any sale or offering for sale that will defeat the temporary pres-
ence defense, but only a sale or offering by the defendant. 92 A
sale by a third party cannot defeat the defendant's temporary
presence defense under § 272.193 The court invoked Chief Jus-
tice Taney's illustration in Brown where use of the invention
would have become infringing if the ship's captain had sold the
invention himself while his ship was harbored in a U.S. port.19 4
The appellate court also addressed the fact that Canadian Pa-
cific might have sold the railcars to a U.S. finance company as
part of a leaseback agreement.195 The appellate court agreed
with the district court that such an arrangement with a U.S. fin-
ancier would defeat the temporary presence defense.196 Not
only would the sale by Canadian Pacific in the United States be a
sale that nullifies § 272, but passing title to a U.S. corporation
would transform the railcars into a vehicle of the United States
thus defeating the requirement that the vehicles be of another
country. 9 7 However, because Canadian Pacific had not reached
a decision on the ownership structure for the railcars, it was im-
proper to hold that the § 272 defense lacked substantial merit
based on what Canadian Pacific might do.198
In its analysis, however, the Federal Circuit failed to address
the reciprocity requirement of § 272,199 presumably because rec-
iprocity was assumed to be met by virtue of the fact that Canada
is a signatory to the Paris Convention. 20 0 Furthermore, ex-
pounding on the requirement would only provide limited gui-
dance in future cases because the laws and treaties of the other
country must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine






195 Id. at 1333-34.
196 Id. at 1334.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See id. at 1328-34.
200 Contracting Parties, supra note 83.
201 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. C1. 197, 240-41 & n.67
(1993).
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procity element left Hughes Aircraft as the sole authority on what
is required for the reciprocity element to be satisfied. Accord-
ingly, the element is satisfied if the other country generally of-
fers similar protections to vessels, aircraft, and vehicles of the
United States, regardless of whether that privilege would be ap-
plicable to the specific situation.2"2
IV. THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE DEFENSE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO AIRLINE SECURITY PATENTS
From its inception in the 1850s until today, the bedrock prin-
ciple of the temporary presence defense has remained: interna-
tional commerce should not be burdened by requiring its
"vehicles . . . to conform to the patent laws of all nations [it
might visit] during its lifetime."2 °3 The defense continues to
grow in importance as commerce becomes more global in na-
ture. 20 4 This globalization of commerce is especially evident in
the realm of commercial air travel, where conflict will inevitably
arise between U.S. patentees and the security procedures of for-
eign airlines. As a solution, application of the § 272 defense will
not only serve the long-recognized policy of supporting interna-
tional commerce, 20 5 particularly air travel in this context, but it
will also further goals of increasing flight safety and security.
Additionally, the application of § 272 recognizes the reality that
many services and activities are necessarily incidental to moving
a vehicle through various nations for purposes of engaging in
international commerce.
A. VESSEL, AIRCRAFr, OR VEHICLE OF ANOTHER COUNTRY
Section 272 applies to vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.20 6 In Na-
tional Steel Car, the Federal Circuit used the Dictionary Act and
plain meanings to construe the term "vehicle" broadly.20 7 The
Dictionary Act does not provide a definition for the word "air-
craft. 202 However, one plain meaning is "'[a] machine or de-
vice, such as an airplane, a helicopter, a glider, or a dirigible,
202 Id. at 241 n.67.
203 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1330.
204 See Field, supra note 51, at 29.
205 See Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1330.
206 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006).
207 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1328.
208 See 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2006).
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that is capable of atmospheric flight.' ,,209 That the word "air-
plane" appears within the given definition tends to show that
regardless of which definition is chosen, the airplanes utilized by
commercial airlines will surely be included.2 1 ° In fact, a prop-
erly broad definition of "aircraft" would likely include almost
any kind of flying machine imaginable. 211
The next inquiry under this element is whether the patented
invention is used "in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle. ' 212 None of
the cases interpreting § 272 focused on the requirement that
the invention be used in the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle because
the cases up to this point have all dealt with inventions made
part of the conveyance for the purpose of somehow improving
it, rather than processes used to ensure safe or efficient opera-
tion of the conveyance.2 13 Taken literally, the statute would
seem to draw a needless distinction between security measures
practiced onboard the airplane and ones practiced in the termi-
nal, because an airport terminal is not an aircraft or vehicle.214
Under such a construction, § 272 would allow a foreign airline
that conducts its own security measures in the United States to
use a patented security process designed to detect bombs hid-
den on one's person, but only once the passengers were
onboard the aircraft. The optimal time to use such a process,
however, is before all of the passengers are congregated aboard
the airplane because at that point the danger is already real-
ized.215 Such a formalistic rule is of little use to foreign airlines
that would like to maintain the safety and security of their oper-
ations, or to patentees who, if they choose, would have the right
to force airlines to use the invention only within the cramped
quarters of the airplane.
A more sensible construction of the statute would recognize
that because the drafters had tangible devices in mind when
§ 272 and its antecedents were penned,21 6 the language is
20 Field, supra note 51, at 85-86 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 38 (4th ed. 2000)).
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006) (emphasis added).
213 See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 240
(1993); Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
214 See 35 U.S.C. § 272.
215 See Travel Assistant, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/air-
travel/assistant/index.shtm (last visited June 8, 2011).
216 See supra Part II.
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slightly unwieldy when applied to inventions that cover methods
or processes. For tangible items, such as the configuration of
sails on a ship, the invention necessarily travels onboard or at-
tached to the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle. But for method patents,
such as a process for loading cargo, the invention might be prac-
ticed in very close relation to the conveyance but still not di-
rectly in or on it. A better reasoned approach would avoid
absurd results, such as permitting the use of a patented method
for loading cargo, but only if the loading method is used en-
tirely within the vehicle. Consequently, the proper interpreta-
tion would allow use of a patented invention to fall within § 272
if the use is "closely-related" to the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle.
Under this rule, pre-boarding security measures conducted in
the airport terminal would be included as closely-related to the
aircraft because the measures are conducted in close proximity
to the aircraft for the purpose of ensuring flight safety. This
result would allow foreign airlines to use their security proce-
dures in the most optimal manner, which ensures airline safety
and promotes international commerce in the airline industry.
Alternatively, courts could consider the airport terminal to be
an extension of the aircraft as a matter of law. Previously, courts
have treated areas outside of an airplane as an extension of the
airplane in certain contexts, even when the connection to the
aircraft seems to be tenuous when compared to the connection
between an airplane and the airport terminal.217 Under this
rule, any security measures conducted in the terminal would be
presumed by the law to have taken place in the aircraft for pur-
poses of § 272. Like the rule that would allow for uses closely-
related to the aircraft, this solution avoids drawing needless dis-
tinctions between security measures conducted in the aircraft
and those conducted in the airport terminal. Additionally, it
carries the advantage of carving out a narrow exception for us-
ing patented method inventions related to airline security
within the airport terminal. Thus, the risk of unintended conse-
quences is diminished, as the rule would not sanction the use of
patented inventions in close relation to vessels and vehicles in
other contexts. Regardless of whether courts opt for the closely-
related approach or choose to treat the terminal as an extension
of the aircraft, the goals of promoting airline security and avoid-
217 United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Because some
of the contents of the [air]craft... were transferred to the appellant's auto upon
his first landing in the United States, the car constituted an extension of the
airplane" for purposes of a border search.).
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ing undue burdens on international air commerce will be
served.
B. TEMPORARY OR ACCIDENTAL PRESENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES
The next requirement under § 272 is that the vessel, aircraft,
or vehicle must have entered the United States "temporarily or
accidentally." 218 The Federal Circuit adopted a broad test by
holding that entering "temporarily" means "entering for a pe-
riod of time of finite duration with the sole purpose of engaging
in international commerce. 219 While the duration of the stay is
irrelevant, the court did warn, however, that once the foreign
vessel, aircraft, or vehicle enters the United States, engaging in
any domestic commerce will defeat the "temporarily" ele-
ment.220 Under this definition, foreign aircraft sent into and
out of the United States for the purposes of completing interna-
tional commercial flights would qualify as entering temporarily,
so long as they do not complete any domestic flights. Commer-
cial airliners that enter the United States to unload passengers,
reload, and depart for another destination outside of the United
States have obviously entered for a finite period with the pur-
pose of participating in international commerce.
Courts have already rejected the argument that foreign air-
lines' airplanes cannot be temporarily present because their
presence is frequent and systematic in nature. Even before the
Federal Circuit announced its broad test for "temporarily," the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recog-
nized that § 272's underlying purpose was to meet the realities
of international trade.221 Consequently, that court held that at a
minimum temporary presence must allow for a commercial air-
craft to "complet[e] a voyage, turn[ ] about, and continu[e] or
commenc[e] a new voyage. '"222 Thus, aircraft of foreign airlines
may be present temporarily despite the fact that the airlines
maintain a continuous presence in the United States and de-
spite the frequency and regularity of the individual incidents of
temporary presence within the United States.2 2 3
218 35 U.S.C. § 272.
219 Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
220 Id. at 1331-32.




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
C. OF A COUNTRY THAT AFFORDS SIMILAR PRIVILEGES
The third element of § 272 is the requirement that the vessel,
aircraft, or vehicle be from another country that affords a simi-
lar defense to vessels, aircraft, or vehicles from the United
States. 224 This reciprocity element requires examining the laws
and treaties of the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle's home country in
order to determine whether that country affords a similar privi-
lege to the vessels, aircraft, and vehicles of the United States. 225
This element does not pertain to the general applicability of
§ 272 to airline security patents because the inquiry will depend
entirely on the country from which the specific aircraft hails.226
The element is satisfied only if the country provides a privilege
similar to the § 272 defense to vessels, aircraft, or vehicles from
the United States.2 27
However, the inquiry into the reciprocal treatment by the
other country's laws is not a specific one.228 In Hughes Aircraft,
the patentee unsuccessfully argued that to satisfy § 272, the for-
eign country must interpret its temporary presence provisions to
be applicable to the specific situation before the court.229 In
that case, the patentee argued that because the United King-
dom's patent statutes would not recognize spacecraft as a "vehi-
cle" for purposes of its temporary presence defense, the § 272
privilege should not extend to English spacecraft entering the
United States. 230 The Court of Federal Claims rejected this ar-
gument, holding that the inquiry into reciprocity need only de-
termine whether the other country generally provides a
privilege similar to the § 272 defense to U.S. vessels, aircraft,
and vehicles. 231 This holding is consistent with the policy prefer-
ence of broadly applying § 272 as later set forth in National Steel
Car.232 Indeed, the Federal Circuit's refusal to address the issue
in National Steel Car indicates tacit approval for the rule adopted
in Hughes Aircraft.233
224 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006).
225 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 241 n.67 (1993).
226 See 35 U.S.C. § 272.
227 Id.
228 See Field, supra note 51, at 88-89.
229 Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 at 241 n.67.
230 Id.
231 Id.
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While the specificity of the inquiry into reciprocity might not
bear directly on whether § 272 is generally applicable to airline
security patents, the fact that the looser test prevails further es-
tablishes a policy of widely applying the defense. The adopted
rule ensures that the defense applies to vehicles from more
countries, including ones whose reciprocal defense might be un-
derdeveloped or underinclusive, in order to foster international
commerce. The same underlying purpose of encouraging inter-
national commerce supports applying § 272 to airline security
patents. Plus, expanding the defense to apply to airline security
measures supports safety and security of international flights.
D. EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE NEEDS OF THE VESSEL, AIRCRAFT,
OR VEHICLE
The fourth requirement of § 272 is that the invention be
"used exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft or vehi-
cle. ' 234 The Federal Circuit held that this element's require-
ments must comport with Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention. 235 The temporary presence defense first recog-
nized in Brown extended to uses "in the construction, fitting out,
or equipment of [a] vessel. ' 236 Article 5ter of the Paris Conven-
tion requires that the invention must be used in the body, ma-
chinery, tackle, gear, or accessories of a vessel when such use is
exclusively for the needs of the vessel.23 7 Alternatively, in the
case of an aircraft or land vehicle, Article 5ter requires that the
invention must be used in the construction or operation of the
aircraft or land vehicle, or of its accessories.3 8 Under these
guidelines, the Federal Circuit held that the qualifying needs
under § 272 include at least propulsive and structural needs. 239
However, many items beyond propulsive and structural needs,
such as the heating and air conditioning system, could easily be
included within § 272's scope.240 Furthermore, because the
needs vary depending on the kind of conveyance and its use, the
type of vessel, aircraft, or vehicle at issue will bear on whether an
invention is exclusively for its needs.24 '
234 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006).
235 Natl Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1332-33.
236 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1856).
237 Paris Convention, supra note 84.
238 Id.
239 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1332-33.
240 Field, supra note 51, at 91.
241 Id. at 91-92.
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Based on this framework, the use of airline security inventions
would almost certainly be a use exclusively for the needs of the
aircraft. There is little doubt that inventions aimed at improv-
ing the safety of a vessel, aircraft, or vehicle will similarly be ex-
clusively for the needs of the conveyance. For example, an
automobile's safety belts, air bags, and anti-lock brake system
seem to plainly be used exclusively for the needs of the vehicle.
Because needs vary according to the vehicle and its use, today a
commercial jetliner traveling internationally certainly has an el-
evated need for security measures to ensure the safety of its pas-
sengers.242 To meet the "exclusively for the needs of' element,
the use must satisfy Article 5ter, which, in the case of aircraft,
requires that the invention be used in the construction or opera-
tion of the aircraft or its accessories.243 Inventions pertaining to
security measures would qualify because security measures are
absolutely critical to the safe and efficient operation of commer-
cial aircraft today, particularly on international flights. 44 The
need for safety on these flights not only satisfies this particular
element, but it also supports the broader proposal of applying
§ 272 to airline security patents.
E. No SALES OR MANUFACTURING ACTMTY
Finally, § 272 requires that the invention must not be "offered
for sale or sold in or used for the manufacture of anything to be
sold in or exported from the United States. 245 The Federal Cir-
cuit clarified that the sales or manufacturing activity must be
perpetrated by the defendant for the "no sales" element of § 272
to be defeated.246 A third party cannot unilaterally defeat the
defendant's privilege under § 272 by engaging in infringing
sales activity in the United States. 47 In fact, the Supreme
Court's illustration in Brown supports this proposition because it
was only sales activity by the ship's captain that would defeat his
temporary presence defense and make his use infringement. 24
Sales or manufacturing activity will hardly be an issue when
applying the temporary presence defense to airline security pat-
242 See id.
243 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1332-33.
244 See Global Strategies, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/
harmonization.shtm (last visited June 8, 2011).
245 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006)
246 Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1333.
247 Id.
248 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 196 (1856).
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ents. Airlines are not in the habit of selling their security meth-
ods, and such processes are incapable of manufacturing or
producing any good that might be sold or exported. The un-
likelihood of these sales further supports applying § 272 to air-
line security patents because the chance of an infringing sale
that would cause actual harm to the patentee by violating his
right to marketplace exclusivity is very remote. Thus, the risk of
harm is miniscule, especially in comparison to the advancement
of the policy aims for safer air travel and robust international
commerce free from burdens.
F. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
Additionally, Article 27 of the Chicago Convention provides a
temporary presence defense specifically applicable to aircraft
engaged in international air travel.249 However, because no case
has been decided solely based on Article 27, it is unclear
whether a court would treat the Article 27 defense as substan-
tially different from § 272.5 ° In fact, Cali is the only case to spe-
cifically mention the Article. 51 In that case, the only relevant
holdings were that the treaty is valid,252 and that, while Article
27 appears to literally allow broader uses to still fall under the
defense, the language may be problematic.253 Therefore, Article
27 could be construed as implicitly limited to the bounds set out
by § 272 and its precedents, Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention. In that event, the analysis and result under the
Chicago Convention would be the same as if the defendant in-
voked § 272, and the courts could properly apply the defense to
the context of airline security patents under either law.
On the other hand, Article 27 of the Chicago Convention
might be applied exactly as it reads. If a literal interpretation
applies, the aircraft must be (1) of a country that is party to the
treaty, (2) authorized to be in the United States, and (3) en-
249 Chicago Convention, supra note 91.
250 See Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
251 Id. at 1123.
252 Id. at 1124 ("It is concluded . . . Article 27 of the Chicago Convention,
Article 5ter, of the Paris Convention, and Section 272, are constitutionally valid as
applied to the defendants' uses of plaintiffs patented engines, and, therefore,
accord defendants a complete defense to the claims against them for patent
infringement.").
253 Id. at 1123 ("The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, at
least in form, seems much more inclusive in defining the exempted uses, al-
though its language presents some difficulty.").
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gaged in international air travel.254 If those three conditions are
met, which would be the case for foreign airlines flying in and
out of U.S. airports, the only remaining requirement is that the
patented invention must be used in an aircraft's parts, mecha-
nisms, accessories, or operation. 25
5
Thus, under a literal interpretation, a foreign airline's aircraft
is entitled to use any patented invention in the parts, mecha-
nisms, accessories, and operation of the aircraft. Paradoxically,
this so-called broader defense might not be as readily applicable
as § 272 for patents related to airline security. While § 272 is
satisfied if the airline security invention is used exclusively for
the operating needs of the aircraft, Article 27 provides a defense
if the invention is used in the operation of the aircraft.256 Con-
sequently, under § 272, security measures might be exclusively
for operation of the aircraft, even if "operation" refers only to
flying, because the security measures are provisions intended to
ensure the safety of those flying operations. However, if opera-
tion of an aircraft is restricted to its actual flying, security mea-
sures may be too remote from actual flying to qualify as being
used in those operations. If a literal approach to Article 27 is
required, courts should interpret operation of the aircraft
broadly in order to reach the correct result. Thus, operation of
the aircraft would include important pre-flight procedures, es-
pecially those concerning the ultimate safety of the flight. In
that case, security procedures would be used in operation of the
aircraft because they serve an important role in ensuring that
the aircraft's flight is safe. Construing operation of the aircraft
broadly allows the courts to apply Article 27's defense to airline
security patents, serving the aims of the defense itself by promot-
ing international commerce in the air travel context and en-
couraging foreign airlines to protect flights in the United States
by utilizing security procedures.
V. CONCLUSION
With increasing numbers of patents on airline security being
issued, and perhaps thousands more lying in wait while subject
to secrecy orders, a collision between an issued patent and the
security procedures of a foreign-based airline is almost assuredly
on the horizon. When the courts have to resolve these disputes,
254 Chicago Convention, supra note 91.
255 Id.
256 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006), with Chicago Convention, supra note 91.
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they should employ the temporary presence defense. Doing so
will serve the doctrine's underlying purpose of preventing pat-
ent infringement liability from hindering international com-
merce. Applying the defense to airline security patents will
avoid placing undue burden on airlines engaged in interna-
tional commerce, who would otherwise have to ensure that their
airline security procedures comply with the patent laws of every
nation they may fly into. Furthermore, with the untold number
of airline security patents currently subject to secrecy orders,
avoiding liability for infringement in this area is akin to negotiat-
ing a minefield.
Beyond the principles that traditionally justify the temporary
presence defense, the United States should adopt a policy that
encourages, rather than discourages, foreign airlines in con-
ducting extra security measures for international flights. Doing
so will not only increase the safety and security of those flights,
but it will help develop state of the art airline security.
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